

AD-A274 544

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 01/05/93	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE PEACEKEEPING IN EUROPE: HOW CAN THE UNITED NATIONS DO IT?		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC TERRY L. TUCKER, USA		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ATTN; ATZL-SWV FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900 COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ABSTRACT DTIC ELECT JAN 08 1993 B L			
14. SUBJECT TERMS PEACEKEEPING PEACEMAKING PEACE-ENFORCEMENT		PEACE-BUILDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY	
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 56		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

**Peacekeeping In Europe:
How can the United Nations do it?**

**A Monograph
by
Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Tucker
Armor**



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AY 92-93

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93-31506



93 12 28062

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Title of Monograph: Peacekeeping In Europe: How can the United Nations
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ABSTRACT

PEACEKEEPING IN EUROPE: HOW CAN THE UNITED NATIONS DO IT?
by LTC Terry L. Tucker, USA, 56 pages.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, no nation or organization has come forward to become the dominate peacemaker or peacekeeper in Europe. This study discusses the need for a country or a supernational organization to accept the lead role of making and keeping peace between independent states as well as between waring factions or ethnic groups within states in Europe.

Based on an examination of the UN charter, his study establishes authority for UN peacekeeping operations, it analyzes expending roles of the UN in peacekeeping and peace-building, and analyzes the applicability of the Weinberger Criteria to peacekeeping operations. It then develops the need for continued U.S. world leadership and support for UN peacekeeping efforts around the world.

Finally, this study closes with two major conclusions. First, that the United Nations has a significant role to play in making and keeping peace in Europe. It can best accomplish that role by developing an organization under one Deputy Secretary-General which can effectively operate through all phases of conflict resolution and by convincing NATO to serve as its chief regional organization for operations in Europe. And second, it concludes that the UN, NATO and the U.S. must be prepared for a long term commitment if peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building are conducted in Eastern Europe. The conflict will not be resolved quickly.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has been one of the most violent in human history. Since the end of the Second World War, our community of nations has managed to avoid nuclear warfare, but conventional conflicts have flared with increasing regularity.¹ Within the last ten years, most of those conflicts have been caused by ethnic or religious unrest. There are few tools available to resolve ethnic, religious, and international conflict; the success rate has not been overwhelming. Among the most important, however, are the potential peacemaking and peacekeeping powers of the United Nations. During the Cold War, the United Nations made important, but limited, contributions in these areas. Now, as a consequence of radical change in the former Soviet Union, these tools for conflict containment and resolution have begun to be applied in earnest. The question investigated here is whether they can be successfully applied to long-standing conflicts in Europe.

Peacekeeping operations have been among the United Nations' (UN) most visible and innovative activities. As the UN peacekeeping motto states, "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."² Over half a million people have served in 27 mandated peacekeeping missions, under the UN Secretary-General's command, since 1948. Most of these people have been soldiers who volunteered to apply military discipline and training to the task of maintaining or restoring the peace.

As the East-West political ideological differences have narrowed and the Cold War ended in 1990, UN peacekeeping operations have expanded in both number and complexity; a new type of UN peacekeeping

is evolving. Increasingly, peacekeeping operations are set up to help implement negotiated settlements of conflict between hostile parties, help administer countries and bring about fair elections or provide humanitarian relief. Soldiers, police officers and civilians, all under UN control, are integrated into a complex organization whose function is not only to keep the peace in the traditional military way but also to help former combatants build a new, peaceful future.

In January, 1992, the UN Security Council met for the first time ever at the heads-of-state level. Their meeting marked an unprecedented commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The heads of state called on the Secretary-General to recommend ways of improving the organizations's work at preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.³ In June, 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the member states. He recommended ways to enhance the UN's performance in preventing conflict, in some instances through preventive deployment of a UN presence or establishment of demilitarized zones in potential conflict areas. He also recommended new ways of using military force under UN direction in the pursuit of peace or under regional authority.⁴

Since the warming between the East and West, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, no nation or organization has come forward to become the dominate peacemaker or peacekeeper in Europe. As a result, renewed nationalism and ethnic unrest have caused continual political, social, economic and military confrontations. There is a need for an organization to accept the

lead role of making and keeping peace between independent states as well as between warring factions or ethnic groups, within states, in Europe. This role must fall to the United Nations, either in the traditional peacekeeping role or, if necessary, by a UN sanctioned and controlled European regional organization. Additionally, the UN must develop a focused staff organization which can assist the Security Council and the Secretary-General with the difficult day-to-day details and required coordination to successfully plan, organize and conduct peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

This study is important to scholars, diplomats and military leaders who must find a way to make and maintain regional stability in Eastern Europe. It is one of the first studies to discuss specifically how the United Nations can use NATO as its chief regional agent to bring and keep that stability. It is also one of the first documents to analyze the Weinberger Criteria in terms of its applicability to peacekeeping operations.

This study will examine the UN charter, its founders' intent, and the authority for UN peacekeeping operations. It will analyze recent peacekeeping trends within the UN and discuss NATO's future role. American responsibilities for world leadership will be discussed and the applicability of the Weinberger Criteria to peacekeeping will be analyzed. This study will conclude that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), assisted by other European regional organizations, can serve as the United Nations' chief agent for maintaining peace throughout Europe. A political model will be presented also to show how the UN can control such an operation.

Several common, but often misused, terms will be used throughout this monograph. They are defined in Appendix A:

- Coalition Action
- Conflict
- Crisis
- Humanitarian Operations
- Peacekeeping
- Peacemaking
- Peace-building
- Peace-enforcement
- Preventive Diplomacy
- Preventive Deployment

II. THE UNITED NATIONS

We think of the peacekeeping role as one belonging to the United Nations. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides authority, under the supervision of the Security Council, to make, keep or enforce the peace.⁵ However, peacekeeping as we know it is a UN invention. It was not specifically defined in the Charter but evolved as a non-violent instrument to control conflict at a time when Cold War constraints prevented the Security Council from taking the more forceful steps permitted by the Charter. Peacekeeping has often proved easier and more politically acceptable than the UN entrusted functions of peacemaking and peace-enforcement.

UN AUTHORITY FOR PEACEKEEPING

Chapter IV of the Charter lays out general principles upon which the peace and security system of the Charter is based, namely that the General Assembly is primarily the organ for discussion, while the Security Council is the organ for action. The Charter provides two circumstances under which the General Assembly can make recommendations regarding international peace and security. The first is when the Security Council is not exercising its functions

under the Charter and the second is when the Security Council requests the General Assembly consider a question and make recommendations.⁶

Several chapters and articles of the UN Charter authorize UN action to stem an act of aggression. Article 39 makes it the responsibility of the Security Council to determine the "existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."⁷ When the Council decides that such a condition exists, it may decide to take measures not involving use of armed force such as halting economic relations or severing diplomatic relations. If that does not work, the Security Council "may take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."⁸

The smaller nations of the UN were opposed to giving the Security Council absolute power to impose a particular settlement. At the same time, they were equally anxious to make it as difficult as possible for the Council to avoid its responsibilities for keeping the peace.⁹ Therefore, an agreement was reached between the Security Council and the general membership that no member of the Organization would be obligated to employ armed forces or to participate in enforcement operations called for by the Security Council.

The founders of the UN intended the Security Council to have wide latitude in its choice of the most appropriate method to deal with threats to peace or aggression. One of the major failings of the League of Nations had been its lack of authority to take necessary measures, including force, to maintain peace and security. The founders wanted there to be no doubt about the duty of the

Security Council to take necessary enforcement measures when faced with flagrant acts of aggression, but were quick to restrict their powers. The small powers recognized their need for a strong Security Council, but, at the same time, feared a Council with too much authority.

UN TRACK RECORD

While the UN has had success in some areas of the world, peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (since 1948), India-Pakistan (since 1949), Cyprus (since 1964) and Lebanon (since 1978) have demonstrated that once UN forces are employed, they often remain indefinitely to maintain peace.¹⁰

Current United Nations peacekeeping attempts in Iraq, Somalia, Cambodia and Bosnia are potentially long term involvements, will be very expensive and certainly are more complicated than past operations. In Iraq and Somalia, UN peacekeeping efforts were ineffective until peace-enforcement operations set the conditions for peacekeeping to occur. Peacekeeping has already failed in Bosnia and is now failing in Cambodia. Only time will tell if they follow the same path as Iraq and Somalia; most observers believe they will. In Kuwait, a multi-national coalition had to evict forcibly Iraqi forces before the UN could establish an operation; in Somalia, the United States was needed first to secure ports, distribution centers and convoys before UN sponsored humanitarian relief could take place. In Cambodia and Bosnia, UN peacekeepers have not been able to stop or even significantly reduce the fighting, and military intervention is being demanded from many quarters to stop the conflict.¹¹

Obviously, it is more efficient and desirable to use diplomacy to ease tensions before they result in conflict. To develop further preventive diplomacy, the United Nations is exploring several ways of adopting measures to increase its effectiveness and responsiveness. In trying to establish an early warning system for assessing possible threats to peace, the Security Council is attempting to identify those economic and social situations that might pose a threat to international peace and security. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has already introduced a new technique which he refers to as preventive deployment. Under this method, UN forces are sent to an area to deter cross border attacks or prevent hostilities within a country, rather than wait until after armed conflict has occurred. Demilitarized zones are then established in a preventive, rather than a post-conflict, context to separate potential belligerents.¹² This closely describes the current UN operation in Macedonia, where the UN has sent peacekeepers in an attempt to prevent the Yugoslav conflict from escalating into a total Balkans war.

Between the tasks of preventing conflict and conflict resolution lies the responsibility of bringing hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means if possible, but by other means if necessary. To further this pursuit, the Secretary-General set the stage for an increased UN role during a July 1992 London press conference. He called for the creation of a new category of UN forces which he described as "peace-enforcement units."¹³ These units would be deployed in areas where the task of maintaining a cease-fire might exceed the mission of traditional peacekeeping. Such units would

consist of trained troops more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces. He went on to say:

We are no longer involved only in peace-keeping operations; we are also involved in the reconstruction of a country, in the return of refugees, in creating new institutions, in participating with observers in elections, even in participating in the administration and in Government.¹⁴

The nature of peacekeeping has evolved rapidly in recent years. The international climate has changed and peacekeeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by diplomats, peacemakers or even peace-enforcers. As a result, a new array of demands and problems have emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance. To meet effectively increasing demands, the United Nations needs to establish a peacekeeping reserve fund, improve training for peacekeeping personnel and establish a pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment to supplement under-equipped troops.¹⁵ As an alternative, member nations could commit to keep certain equipment on stand-by for immediate use by the UN when required.

Whereas the aim of preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis, post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence of hostilities.¹⁶ Several post-conflict measures must be considered to build confidence between parties to a dispute. Some of these include repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, temporarily helping to administer governments, and advancing efforts to protect human rights. The current situations in Somalia and El Salvador may be

perfect opportunities to further post-conflict peace-building in the context presented by the Secretary-General.

Perhaps the greatest long-term benefit in these countries could come from reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and infrastructure as part of the peace-building operation. Governmental institutions can be strengthened by improving internal transportation, developing local agriculture, rebuilding the national education system and strengthening democratic institutions.

Eastern Europe presents a similar problem. It has been in political and social disarray since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ethnic, cultural, economic, religious and political factions have demanded more autonomy and say in their governments' decisions. Since February, 1992, the United Nations has had over 15,000 military and civilian personnel in former Yugoslavia to ensure the conditions of peace and security required for negotiation of an overall settlement of the crisis.¹⁷ However, there has been little progress and all attempts to bring about peace have failed. In August of 1992, Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the former UN peacekeeping commander in Sarajevo, discussed his pessimism by saying, "I used to use the term guarded optimism, but I've dropped even that from my vocabulary".¹⁸ In December 1992, the current chief UN peacekeeper in Sarajevo, General Aly Abdul Razek, declared peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia a failure and urged the international community to set a one-month deadline before intervening militarily. He said, "All these efforts we have made to save lives have completely failed. The voice of guns is still louder than any peaceful efforts."¹⁹

At the same time the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has taken up the peacekeeping banner as a component of its conflict resolution mandate. The Conference prodded the UN Security Council to enforce the ban on flights by Serbian military planes and helicopters over Bosnia and asked the Security Council to consider lifting the embargo on arms sales to Bosnia's Muslim-led government, which is struggling against better equipped Serbian forces.²⁰

The inability of the United Nations to prevent armed conflict in Bosnia has resulted in the spread of ethnic fighting throughout the region. As a result, there is now a more widespread view that the UN must actively intervene in similar situations, particularly where there is a clear and urgent need for humanitarian assistance. The once universally accepted concept that national sovereignty prevented outside interference in a nation's internal affairs has been breached in Somalia and El Salvador, and there is now every prospect that at least some future "peacekeeping" missions will be mounted without the consent of all involved parties.

The situation in Bosnia has confronted the international community with just such a problem. While none of the parties to that civil war have clean hands, the Serbs clearly are the aggressors, and have openly violated every principle of civilized conduct. The Serbian policy of terrorizing the Bosnian Muslim and Croat population by shelling villages and towns, the deliberate starvation of whole cities, killing of non-combatants, establishment of Nazi-style concentration camps and even mass deportations has become known as "ethnic cleansing".²¹ Non-Serbs have been forced out

of large areas of Bosnia and the most severe refugee problem in Europe since the Second World War has been created. Numerous cease-fires have been meaningless, as the UN troops who served at the Sarajevo airport can attest.²² International condemnations have had no effect, nor have economic sanctions, and there are growing demands for collective military action to stop the genocide aimed at Muslims.²³ In January 1993, the United Nations Security Council gave approval for the use of force and NATO agreed to provide troops and equipment for a large-scale operation to clear land corridors to relieve Sarajevo and other besieged areas. In March 1993, NATO began developing plans to allow forces, under UN control, to intervene in Bosnia for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and to enforce any future peace settlement.

Events over the past year have demonstrated that unrest in Eastern Europe will not be quietened with peacekeeping operations alone; more is needed. A combination of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and then long-term peace-building is needed to stop the fighting, conduct humanitarian relief, negotiate a peaceful settlement and rebuild the region.

RECENT UN POLITICAL TRENDS

Ten years ago a unified, Security Council-sponsored program to bring peace to any region would have been impossible. However, since the breakup of the Soviet bloc, there has been more agreement and cooperation within the Security Council than ever before. The United States and the Soviet Union no longer veto or block the majority of issues because they infringe on the bi-polarity of the past. This has renewed hope for a more agreeable Security Council which can work

together to resolve problems. It also has created a situation where the General Assembly can better work together with the Council, and not against it.

The General Assembly was intended to be an international forum for the discussion of matters of common concern where, by methods of reason and persuasion, action in support of common objectives could be taken.²⁴ During its first 20 years, the General Assembly frequently followed the vote of the United States in most matters. But, because of escalating polarization between the two super-powers and their frequent veto in the Security Council, the General Assembly had, by the mid 1960s, become less aligned with either block. An increasing number of third world nations showed their growing discontent by using the Assembly as a forum for denouncing both poles. Both the Soviet Union and the United States found the General Assembly less willing to be dominated and more willing to condemn actions of the super-powers.

The primary role envisioned for the Security Council was to be responsible for maintaining international peace and security. When the Security Council determined the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," it was to decide what measures should be taken in order "to maintain or restore international peace and security."²⁵

Within little more than a year after the formation of the United Nations, the permanent members had failed to agree on the composition and functioning of the Security Council. The idea that the great powers would be able to take action to maintain world peace, or that they would at least refrain from preventing such action by others,

was based on the premise that local conflicts could be insulated from rivalries among the great powers themselves.²⁶ But in fact almost every issue came to be seen as being of direct concern to the U.S. led Western block and the Soviet Union dominated Eastern block. On most issues they took opposing viewpoints and bi-polarity continued to expand.

To overcome the paralyzing effect of frequent Security Council vetos, the General Assembly took greater responsibility in dealing with threats to peace and security. Later the Secretary-General was given greater authority, enabling him to play a more central role in many crises over the following years. But the most important thing was that the UN remained, for its first twenty years, at the center of the world stage. Each time a new crisis arose, "it was still the Security Council, and at times the General Assembly, that the world looked to for response".²⁷

By the mid-1960s even this degree of UN authority declined. Many states, and international opinion, no longer looked to the UN for effective action. The Western powers, particularly the United States, were no longer able to rely on majority support in the Organization. Therefore, they became increasingly reluctant to work through a frequently hostile General Assembly.

By the 1970s it was no longer only the Soviet bloc that was negative in its approach to the UN and the procedures which it offered. As the Cold War evolved, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union preferred, on all of the most important questions, "to deal directly with each other, outside the ambit of the organization".²⁸ As a result, the UN became increasingly unsuccessful in its ability to

influence nation's actions and mediate unrest or conflict. The world had moved through bi-polarity to one with just two super-powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Only in the past 5 years has that Cold War begun to thaw. In 1989, East and West Germany reunited, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. In 1990, the United States and Russia agreed to support a UN resolution authorizing force against a former Soviet client state. As a result, a coalition of Western and Arab nations, under UN mandate, forced Iraq from Kuwait. The United States and Russia are now working together in ways not thought of only three years ago. From arms reduction, to scientific collaboration, to economic cooperation, the two former super-powers have shown an unparalleled degree of mutual participation. Because of this teamwork, the Security Council more frequently works in concert instead of at opposite ends to bring about regional stability. This new-found cooperation was recently summed up by former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar: "At the beginning, there was an atmosphere shadowed by the reserve and aloofness of major powers towards the United Nations. Today, that has changed into enthusiastic participation."²⁹ While this may be somewhat overstated, the United Nations has at least the potential of returning to the organization it was envisioned to be 45 years ago.

Despite all the recent changes in the world and UN, one thing has not changed: the increased power given the Secretary-General remains. Near the end of his term as UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar recognized that the concept of security has been broadened. He said the non-military aspects--political stability,

respect for human rights, legitimacy of governments, living conditions of populations and environment--are increasingly important. He went on to say that the problems of tomorrow will require less military intervention but more overall involvement by the major powers to maintain security.³⁰

The current UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, often takes a more aggressive approach than his predecessor and his involvement in regional peace and security matters continues to grow. In Bonn, while discussing the ethnic fighting in Bosnia, he told the German leadership that the UN needed the full participation of Germany in peacemaking, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations.³¹ Such German participation would require an amendment to its national constitution to allow operations outside the NATO theater.

His call for U.S. forces to disarm fighting factions in Somalia, his request for peacekeepers in Macedonia to prevent the bloody Yugoslav conflict from escalating into a Balkans war, and his call for NATO military action in Bosnia show his determination to stay in the lead of UN policy making and to expand the role of the UN in maintaining peace and security around the world.

The world has changed significantly over the past 45 years and the United Nations has changed with it. The world has moved from being multi-polar at the end of World War II to being bi-polar during the mid-1960's. The height of the Cold War brought on domination by the two super-powers and now with the collapse of the Soviet Union we see a mono-polar world. Only the United States has the three

elements of national power (economic, political and military) needed to be a true super-power.

At the same time the United Nations has grown from a body that relied on the Security Council for direction, to one which was almost ineffective because of differences between the two super-powers. Now the UN is returning to an organization which cooperates within its major bodies--as intended in the beginning.³²

III. THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD LEADERSHIP

The United States has moved away from being the sole participant when taking action against a potential or actual aggressor. Former President Bush adopted the role of world leader and was very successful in getting other nations to follow his lead in fighting threats to peace and security. For this success to remain, the current American administration must continue to take the lead in maintaining a peaceful world. This is not to suggest that the United States should decide on a course of action, then act alone, but rather lead a coalition of nations or support a UN mandated force to resolve conflict around the world. The United Nations, NATO, and individual nations, often talk about, but seldom act against, uncivilized actions by nations or individuals without the U.S. prodding them along. In discussing the United Nations role in Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that any UN proposal for action required strong political leadership, and that "as the only Superpower, the U.S. must be aboard if not in the lead."³³

American leadership is more important now than ever before. There will not be peace and security in the world without it. Former

Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, said that any strategy of the United States that does not proceed from the assumption that the U.S. ultimately is the one that has to provide leadership in moments of grave international crisis is doomed to fail.³⁴ Mister Cheney's and Mister Boutros-Ghali's comments are not new concepts, but the last few years has seen an increased resignation that the world believes them to be so.

Whether we talk about Eastern Europe, Somalia, or the Middle East, the United States must lead, economically, politically and militarily. No other country can provide the leadership needed to get the United Nations or the world to act. While there are no American forces in Yugoslavia, UN peacekeepers were deployed there only after the United States called for action in the Security Council. No country or organization was willing to tackle the mission of disarming Somali gangs and protecting relief convoys before the United States elected to do so. There is no evidence to show that the United Nations would have acted to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait without strong U.S. leadership. There was no possibility for a UN mandated coalition during the Gulf crisis without America's persistence. Only the United States had the military strength, political courage and public resolve to act in these crises.

The events of the past two years demonstrate the need for continued American leadership. Predictions for the future are that the world will continue to be full of crisis and danger. The United States must continue to shape international thinking and action to support not only its own national interests, but also the interests

of spreading peace and security throughout the world. Or as President Clinton said in his inaugural address on 20 January, 1993:

Today, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make.³⁵

Perhaps one of the most difficult strategic decisions the U.S. must make as a nation is when to advocate the use of force to accomplish its national objectives. Former Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, developed six major tests to be applied when weighing the proposed use of U.S. combat forces abroad. He believed the U.S. should not go to war unless the following conditions were met:

First, the U.S. should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the objectives are vital to national interests. Second, if combat forces are used, they should be used wholeheartedly, and with a clear intention of winning. Third, clear military and political objectives must be established. Fourth, decisive force should be applied to ensure objectives are accomplished. Fifth, there must be a reasonable assurance that the American people and Congress will support the action. And sixth, The U.S. should use combat force only as a last resort.³⁶

Weinberger's Criteria for employing combat forces have been repeatedly analyzed since they were written in 1984. Until now most theorists have agreed with his assessment. However, these criteria must be looked at within the context of peacekeeping operations to determine if they remain valid.

Weinberger's first criterion is that any commitment of U.S. forces should be to protect "vital" national interests. If the most recent five UN peacekeeping operations are reviewed, it is hard to conclude that vital interests are at stake in any of them. While operations in Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, Angola, and El Salvador may all be worthy operations to stop fighting, feed the hungry or oversee elections, it is hard to justify any of them as "vital" to the interests of the United States or to our foreign policy.

Weinberger's second criterion is that when U.S. forces are used they should be used with the full "intention of winning". In the majority of the examples given above, there is nothing for the U.S. to win. We can temporarily prevent people from starving, reduce killing, torture, or ethnic cleansing and assist in free elections, but none of these successes can be categorized as winning.

Weinberger's third criterion is that "clear political and military objectives" must be established. We have seen neither in any of the above mentioned cases. However, the United States currently provides or supports military peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations in each of these countries. In each case there is little to suggest that objectives will be further defined or established.

While speaking to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, President George Bush stated that there was no "easy formula" for deciding when to commit American forces to battle, but set out his guiding principles: the stakes must be sufficiently high to risk American lives, the force must be capable of producing the desired effect, no other policies are likely to prove effective, sufficient force must

be used, then withdrawn once the mission is accomplished, and the political benefits must justify the potential costs and sacrifice.³⁷

President Bush did not speak of using force only when our vital national interests are at stake. Military force may not be the best way to safeguard something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital. In his assessment, vital national interest is no longer an overriding requirement.

Former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, concurred with most of Weinberger's Criteria for committing U.S. forces to combat. However, he disagreed with the argument that any mission required broad public support. He said, "Sometimes you may not be able to identify that support, but you will need to act."³⁸ When considering the use of American combat forces to conduct peacekeeping operations, this criterion must be closely considered. A case can be made that the American government should employ combat forces against an adversary when U.S. vital interests are at stake, even if there is not public support for such action. However, it is difficult to believe that American forces would be committed to a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation, where no vital interests are threatened, without broad public support.

Mister Weinberger's rules for committing American forces were valid at a time when the U.S. was recovering from the aftermath of the Vietnam War and involved in a Cold War policy. However, today the new world order demands a modified set of criteria for employing force when that force is used to support a just cause. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement fit into this category.

IV. REGIONAL PEACEKEEPERS

The United Nations is not the only international organization concerned with peace and security. Nations in most parts of the world have banded together to form regional organizations. Some are primarily military alliances while others are mainly political and economic groups. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are the most obvious of the former while the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League are primarily political arrangements.

EUROPEAN PEACEKEEPERS: NATO, CSCE AND THE WEU

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is perhaps the most successful alliance in human history. For more than 40 years, it has kept the peace in Europe.³⁹ Certainly, we do not know what the world would have been like without NATO, but there is every reason to believe that the Soviet Union would have transformed Europe, or a large part of it, according to communist ideology.

NATO's purpose, according to its founders and restated in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting order in Europe.⁴⁰

Europe is undergoing sweeping change. This process will continue for several years to come and will be influenced by both the

integration brought about by the European Community (EC) and the disintegration which is taking place in Eastern Europe.

Just as Europe has changed, NATO's role in Europe also has changed. The former NATO nuclear strategy of flexible response, developed to meet a danger of sudden, overwhelming conventional attack, no longer is required because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Alliance has made a major transformation by adopting a wholly new strategic concept. The aim is to maintain a smaller but capable collective military organization in order to serve NATO's political objectives.⁴¹ This structure will provide sufficient military forces to protect the peace, to manage crisis and to provide for defense. Military forces will be capable of several missions, including deterrence and support for crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and, as before, the defense of Alliance territory.⁴²

The future of European regional organizations such as NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) is currently being debated and studied. However, one fact is certain: lasting peace and reform in Europe will come only with the commitment of these regional organizations.⁴³

The CSCE, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the November, 1990 Paris Summit, which recognized the end of the Cold War and institutionalized the CSCE, it now includes new formal arrangements and provides a contractual framework for discussion and cooperation among European nations.⁴⁴ The CSCE can

play a role complementary to that of NATO in the process of European unity and preserving peace.

Until recently, the CSCE did not have the operational resources it needed to support a new Europe in which the risk of major conflict had been replaced by the reality of several minor conflicts both within and among states. Between March and July 1992, the Conference held discussions in Helsinki. The resulting Helsinki Document stated that the CSCE should be considered a "regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter".⁴⁵ That decision opened the way for political and operational collaboration between the CSCE and the UN and legitimized its involvement in regional peacekeeping operations. The inclusion of peacekeeping operations as a means available to the CSCE was of great significance because it transformed the CSCE, for the first time, into an institution with operational functions.

The CSCE indicated that it will conform to the principles of the United Nations in regard to peacekeeping. It will not use force, its actions must be conducted impartially and involvement requires full consent of the parties concerned. However, more recent discussions centered on the possible use of European peace-enforcement units to bring about a resolution in former Yugoslavia. The CSCE has recognized that it must go beyond traditional peacekeeping to bring real peace to Europe.

The Conference concluded with the following fundamental agreements. First, peacekeeping operations may be undertaken in the context of intra-state conflicts. Second, the CSCE may take shelter behind Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and refer problems to the

Security Council. Finally, it may also call for the help, either indirectly or directly of NATO, the EC, the WEU and even the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁴⁶ NATO has agreed that it can place its resources at the CSCE's disposal, but the CSCE made it clear that it would call on NATO only on a case-by-case basis and after consulting with individual members of the Alliance. All Alliance members have agreed that the CSCE should retain responsibility for the direction of operations and that each of the participating states may take part, including states that are not members of NATO.⁴⁷

Other European institutions, such as the WEU and the EC, also have roles to play in the security of Europe. The creation of a European arrangement in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their own security and for stability throughout Europe. While NATO and the CSCE may be the primary forums for discussions among the Allies, the WEU and EC provide additional assemblies for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense of Europe.

Europe is divided on the idea of the CSCE, NATO or another European agency taking up the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mantle. Some nations are willing to accept the role of peacekeeping, but do not support the proposal of peace-enforcement actions. Thus, proposals to use the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), NATO or the WEU for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations under the CSCE clash with the view of some that the UN should remain the leader in keeping peace.⁴⁸ Yet to be resolved are the questions of, if and

how Europe will come to grips with situations such as those in Yugoslavia that threaten security throughout the continent.

Both the search for a European defense association and the efforts to restructure NATO defenses are based on the premise that defense should constitute a collective undertaking.⁴⁹ With this in mind, Germany and France have expanded their military cooperation over and above the existing brigade to form the nucleus for a European Corps to which forces of other WEU states could be added. Its tasks are threefold: combat missions, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions.⁵⁰ It provides a vehicle for tying France closer to a collective defense undertaking and it could counter pressures to renationalize the forces of the united Germany.

On the other hand, its relation to the WEU remains ambiguous and uncertain, particularly since a Joint Committee is to be established for the purpose of implementing decisions by participating governments, coordinating military policy and managing relations with the WEU, NATO and other international organizations. While the Joint Committee should be as compatible as possible with the structures being worked out in the WEU, it could clearly pose a competing, less integrated structure than the two existing alliances (WEU and NATO), and thereby complicate the constitution of the WEU as well as the defense association.

The WEU is designed as the repository of the European defense identity and the European pillar of NATO. The two functions could generate tensions and contradictions, particularly if the European defense identity were to be defined in contrast to the Atlantic dimension rather than as a complement thereto.⁵¹ However, all NATO

states have agreed that the primary responsibilities of forces answerable to the WEU will remain NATO's collective defense under the Washington Treaty.

NATO, the WEU and the CSCE have recognized the need to become more involved in regional security and peacekeeping. In June 1992, the foreign ministers of the NATO Alliance decided that their troops and equipment could be used for peacekeeping outside NATO territory.⁵² That decision reversed a decades-old policy limiting the deployment of forces to the territory of NATO countries. In October of the same year, at a conference in Scotland, the ministers directed their senior military officials to draw up plans for NATO to take a strong role as a European peacekeeper and peace-enforcer.⁵³ At the same time they discussed sending soldiers to Bosnia-Herzegovina to guard relief convoys to the embattled capital. They agreed that any such mission could be under the control of the United Nations or the 52-Nation CSCE.⁵⁴

At that same meeting, NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner said the Alliance, with its military expertise and assets, was uniquely placed to support humanitarian and peacekeeping missions like the one run by the United Nations in former Yugoslavia. He said, "There is a general agreement that indeed one of the new missions of NATO is peacekeeping. We will continue to offer our support to the United Nations and to the CSCE. No other organization could do the same thing in the same efficient way."⁵⁵ British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind agreed, saying: "It clearly is in everyone's interest if NATO, in addition to its defense role, could be used for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks." ⁵⁶

Developing a European force capable of doing both missions, defense and peacekeeping, requires considerable coordination between the competing regional organizations. Some assets may be used for dual purposes, such as territorial protection and for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction CORPS (ARRC) is a case in point. It is also possible to develop systems for dual earmarking of forces to NATO and the WEU. But care must be taken not to overly commit forces or to assign noncompatible missions.

Flexibility and building-block approaches are essential in the construction of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement options. Legitimacy requires UN authorization and perhaps even UN control of the operation. In other instances the CSCE may be in charge as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. NATO and WEU nations may provide national contributions to such operations, but it is also possible that the WEU and even NATO could act collectively, or in the future, be charged with executing the operations on behalf of the CSCE or the UN. The WEU, CSCE and NATO are attempting to work out appropriate response options, and there is no reason why they should not be able to coordinate their efforts and create the means for dealing with the European challenges of the future.

OTHER REGIONAL PEACEKEEPERS

The UN Charter encourages regional organizations' involvement wherever possible to resolve conflict, and calls for cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations.⁵⁷ In a few cases, regional organizations have been effective in temporarily calming local disputes, either independently or under a UN mandate.

On the other hand, they have usually done little more than postpone conflict. The Arab League's involvement during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute in 1961 is a good example of how a regional organization was temporarily effective when the UN failed. After UN inaction during the crisis, the Arab League intervened.⁵⁸ Through diplomacy, peacemaking and the deployment of Arab League forces, Iraq was persuaded to accept Kuwait's borders, at least temporarily.

A second case where a regional organization was reasonably successful was the response of the OAS to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The OAS, led by the United States, authorized all necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to remove the threat to the hemisphere posed by the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba.⁵⁹ While the OAS action would have had little impact if the United States were not totally committed, and leading, their support did help legitimize American action.

For every case where a regional organization has been successful in bringing about peace and stability, there have been many failures. The Arab League was unable to stem the eight year Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The OAU failed to reduce violence in South Africa, stop civil war and external involvement in the Congo during the early 1960's or stop fighting in Southern Rhodesia and Biafra in the late 1960's.⁶⁰ Although the OAS has been involved in several operations over the past 30 years, it has mainly used diplomacy in an attempt to restore peace. It seldom considered coercion unless the United States led such action.

When asked about a regional organization's suitability for conducting peacekeeping operations, Major General Lewis MacKenzie

said his experience showed that as a general rule, they were unsuccessful in keeping peace because they were perceived to have ulterior motives or foreign policy interests by the countries involved.⁶¹

Regional organizations have the ability to deter and resolve local conflict if neither belligerent has used force or if both parties are willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement. However, history has often shown that regional agencies do not have the military strength to keep the peace or enforce a cease fire once armed conflict has begun. Past performance indicates that once fighting erupts, regional organizations are not successful. At best, regional intervention can freeze or temporarily contain conflict; seldom can it resolve it.⁶²

For a regional organization to have any chance of being successful in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation, at least three conditions must be met. First, it must have the support of a major regional power and the organization must be politically and militarily strong enough to persuade and, if necessary, coerce local nations or warring factions to settle their differences. Second, the organization must have the consent of at least one of the parties involved in the conflict to intervene, and third, international support or acceptance is needed to prevent escalation beyond the region.⁶³

NATO is the only organization that has the ability to meet the above conditions. Even if the United States were not involved, NATO has multiple major powers in Europe. Certainly the combined efforts of Germany, Great Britain and France meet these requirements. NATO

has a shared political and strategic focus for Europe, and common military doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures that have been practiced at the operational and tactical level.⁶⁴ NATO may not be able to insure that the consent of at least one involved party is given, but its respected position in Europe does give it necessary credibility. Finally, any NATO involvement that is conducted under a UN mandate would produce the required international support.

There is no regional organization outside of Europe which meets the above-mentioned criteria. Only NATO, either alone or in conjunction with other European organizations such as the CSCE, the WEU or the EC, has the requisite political, military and economic strength to coerce local belligerents to stop fighting and make peace. NATO is unique in that it has extraordinarily wide-ranging political and military assets and experience that do not exist elsewhere.⁶⁵

V. THE NEW PARADIGM

The United Nations must ensure that an apparatus capable of implementing a comprehensive range of peace processes, including all phases of conflict resolution, is set in place.⁶⁶ The current UN organization treats diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement as separate functions headed by different Under Secretaries-General. There is little coordination among the Under Secretaries and no formal connection between these agencies even though their functions are intertwined. This ineffective organization has led to overwhelming bureaucracy and relatively little success.

In fact, these functions should be grouped as phases under the broader category of conflict resolution. The United Nations is no longer clearly able to separate one phase from another. The on-going political, ethnic and social conflicts in Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia have demonstrated that a UN resolution backed-up only with unarmed peacekeepers will not resolve conflict. Macedonia and Croatia may well be the next places we learn this lesson. If conflict spreads from Bosnia into Macedonia and Croatia, there is little hope that UN peacekeepers, stationed there, can prevent the same kind of violence that is currently sweeping Bosnia from all of former Yugoslavia. A far more wide-reaching approach is needed to resolve conflict or restore peace once fighting has erupted.

Somalia can be used as a case in point. There has been Arab League, OAU and UN involvement in Somalia for decades. As early as 1974 the Arab League intervened with peacemaking and preventive diplomatic efforts to stem conflict with Ethiopia and attempt to reduce Soviet influence in the region. By 1988, the situation had deteriorated to a point where the UN evacuated its personnel and reduced its refugee assistance program because of safety; again diplomacy and peacemaking had failed. After further failed peacemaking and diplomatic missions by the UN, OAU and the Islamic Conference, the UN sent peacekeepers in early 1992. By October, it became clear to the Secretary-General that peacekeepers could not stop the fighting or protect humanitarian relief operations and that stronger action was needed.⁶⁷ In November, the United States was asked to intervene to stop fighting, protect UN workers and ensure

the security of humanitarian assistance shipments. Within months the U.S. agreed to disarm rival factions and destroy arms caches.⁶⁸

In Somalia, nearly all phases of conflict resolution have been used. When peacemaking and preventive diplomacy failed, UN mandated peacekeeping operations were tried. When it became obvious that peacekeepers could not resolve fighting between clans, protect UN workers or provide security for humanitarian assistance operations and food distribution, the U.S. was asked to intervene with armed soldiers to separate the factions by force, take weapons and conduct peace-enforcement. If the U.S. is successful, the conditions may be set for the UN to resume peacekeeping and peacemaking and to begin peace-building operations.

Nearly the same scenario has been seen in Eastern Europe. The UN, NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE have conducted preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations within Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia. So far, none of these efforts have stopped the fighting or relieved tensions. Cyrus Vance, the chief UN envoy, and Lord David Owen of the European Community have made little progress in getting Serbs, Croats and Bosnians to discuss a lasting peace and they have made no progress in maintaining a ceasefire. The last opportunity for a peaceful solution may be Mister Vance's proposal to "divide the former Yugoslav republic into 10 autonomous provinces".⁶⁹ If his efforts fail, the next logical step is either to contain the current fighting or use military force to stop it. Either way, coercion (peace-enforcement) must be used.

Any improvement in the performance of the United Nations in maintaining peace and security will have to be based on a coherent

approach to the phases of conflict resolution. If preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peacebuilding can be linked together, under one Deputy Secretary-General, the resulting coordinated effort could give new life and credibility to the United Nations as a maker of peace. In addition, it would provide a legitimate umbrella organization for regional organizations to work under as keepers of the peace.

These phases cannot be viewed as sequential events, where the right time can be determined to intervene and conduct diplomatic discussions or peacemaking operations. They overlap and intertwine so that an organization must be prepared to conduct more than one at the same time. Figure 1 shows the interrelationships between the various phases.⁷⁰ In fact, it is probable that multiple phases will be executed at the same time, within a given regional conflict.




Figure 1

Before any organization can effectively resolve conflict throughout all of the above phases, an efficient information or intelligence system must be established. There is still a great deal

to be done in the UN, both to heighten awareness of the organization and to improve the evaluation of available information. The Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) has been set up to observe events around the world and inform the UN of potential problems as well as the current status of ongoing conflicts.⁷¹ The five permanent members of the Security Council have access to the world's largest intelligence agencies, while the Military Staff Committee (MSC), composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members, has access to the best military intelligence. These agencies should combine their efforts to provide timely and accurate intelligence to the Secretary-General concerning potential conflict.

The Secretary-General is responsible to the Security Council for the organization, conduct, and direction of peacekeeping operations, and he alone reports to the Security Council.⁷² Therein lies part of the problem; there is no standing organization to assist the Secretary-General on a daily basis. Committees are formed as crises develop and there is no single agent within the Secretariat responsible for security operations.

The current cumbersome system has 30 top-level officials reporting directly to the Secretary-General.⁷³ A reorganization of the Secretariat is needed. Deputy Secretaries-General should be appointed, or elected, to be responsible for a group of functions. One of these deputies would be in charge of political, security and peace affairs, bringing together all the different parts of the UN which at present deal separately with such matters. These functions could include a world-wide watch on developments in peace and

security, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, disarmament, arms control and regional security. The UN MSC could be positioned under this Deputy Secretary-General to provide military advice and perform staff functions.

Bringing all these elements together under a single deputy would certainly facilitate the work of the Secretary-General. It would also result in a more coherent and mutually supported system where the Secretariat and Security Council could better maintain international peace and security.

Such a unified organization would serve to keep the Secretary-General and the Security Council alerted to possible conflicts or emergencies. It could develop recommendations for early initiatives by the Secretary-General in the use of UN agencies to resolve disputes before actual crisis. It would conduct contingency planning for possible emergencies. It would support the peacemaking tasks of the Secretary-General, his representatives, or the Security Council by providing information, advice and staff as required. It would unify the elements of maintaining peace and security--peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement--to a single organization and structure. It also would link those functions to the other conflict resolution components of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building. Figure 2 presents a potential organization for a Deputy Secretary-General responsible for political, security and peace affairs.

This organization could initiate timely operational planning for future missions and coordinate the full support of all relevant parts of the Secretariat, as well as support existing peacekeeping

missions. It would maintain constant coordination with member nations that contribute forces and monitor readiness, availability, training, and planning for actual missions.




Figure 2

If the UN uses NATO as its chief agent for regional security in Europe, a UN military model need not be developed. NATO has an experienced and functioning military structure and staff organization capable of planning campaigns, deploying and sustaining forces and providing operational command and control. There is little need for additions to the UN Secretariat to support a military operation. Once the Secretary-General and Security Council decide to act, the

MSC and Deputy Secretary-General for Political, Security and Peace Affairs could provide sufficient guidance for NATO to act.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Peacekeeping is the most prominent and the most expensive activity in the UN today. Over 50,000 UN peacekeepers, on four continents, are a symbol of the United Nations' commitment to international peace and security. They come from 65 nations and represent more than 35 percent of the membership.⁷⁴ In Europe alone, over 15,000 UN peacekeepers are deployed, but the fighting continues unabated. The UN is becoming increasingly less successful in keeping peace. As the number of peacekeeping missions goes up and effectiveness goes down, the cost continues to skyrocket. The cost of peacekeeping efforts in 1992 was in excess of \$3 billion. This figure was two and a half times the budget of the entire Organization.⁷⁵ Projections for next year put the peacekeeping cost at over \$4 billion. The UN can not continue these massive expenditures with little success to show for it.

A historian might say that every period in history could be described as a transitional phase. If that term ever applied, it certainly is true of Europe today.⁷⁶ The Continent is still in transition from the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism and the reunification of Germany. This transition has already affected how peacekeeping in Europe will be done in the future.

Peacekeeping, in its traditional sense, is not effective in Eastern Europe. The UN can not bring about and maintain peace in Europe with a poorly equipped and ad hoc organization as it has attempted to do elsewhere. Ethnic, economic and religious frictions

have brought Europe into a new dimension of conflict. A comprehensive approach encompassing all phases of conflict resolution (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building) must be planned, coordinated and executed by the UN to bring about lasting peace.

The UN Secretary-General recently stated that UN peacekeepers have been powerless to stop fighting in Croatia; he threatened to withdraw them because their own safety was endangered by all sides.⁷⁷ The UN finds itself in the position of having its peacekeepers attacked and blamed for fighting by all three ethnic factions involved in the fighting throughout former Yugoslavia and the region.

The concerns of Russia and members of the former Soviet Union must also be considered before any operations are conducted in a former Eastern bloc country. Until recently, Russia seemed to take a wait-and-see attitude toward UN and Western European involvement in former Yugoslavia. However, since early February mixed signals have been sent by the Russians. On one hand, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has tried to maintain a moderate position and show that Russia supports civilized action to stop the fighting in Bosnia. As a result, NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner has offered to include Russian and other forces from outside the Alliance in a combined operation that could involve combat operations in former Yugoslavia.⁷⁸ On the other hand, Serbian appeals for Russian backing have offered incentives for pro-Serbian, anti-Western hard-liners in Moscow to challenge President Yeltsin within his own party.⁷⁹ The UN and NATO must not view operations in Eastern Europe only in terms of the impact on NATO and the West. They must work to involve Russia

and the CIS in any significant operations if a lasting solution is to be found.

If peace is to come to Europe, the nations of Europe must take the lead and get it done. The UN, the EC, the WEU and the CSCE can provide supporting world opinion, political strength and monetary support, but NATO is the only organization capable of combining the political leadership, military organization and forces necessary to make, enforce and keep the peace.⁸⁰ After peace is restored, the UN, the EC, the WEU and the CSCE can continue their involvement to build a long-term settlement for a secure Europe.

The UN, NATO and the U.S. must be prepared for a long term commitment if peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building are conducted in Eastern Europe. There must be a clear UN mandate to insure that world opinion accepts and supports military intervention and the United States must provide its full support. There is little reason to believe that conflict in Eastern Europe can be quickly resolved. Most observers, particularly those soldiers who must ultimately take up arms to enforce peace, would like to see clear political objectives and acceptable end-states determined and agreed upon by the UN and NATO before full-scale military operations begin. The fact is that the likelihood of such decisions occurring are poor at best and probably non-existent.

However, it is reasonable for peace-enforcers to expect their political leaders to describe, in general terms, how they envision the area to look at the conclusion of peace-enforcement operations.⁸¹ Without this political vision and guidance, military peace-enforcers will find it extremely difficult to develop objectives that will,

when achieved, allow or set the conditions for long-term successful regional peacekeeping and peace-building operations.

The Weinberger Criteria for committing forces must be modified to fit modern peace-enforcement operations. The UN, NATO and the United States should consider the following set of criteria for committing forces to any European peace-enforcement operation: first, there must be a clear UN mandate that is supported by both the people of Europe and the American public. Second, there must be clear intention of taking all necessary steps to stop the fighting and all parties to the dispute must understand that NATO is prepared to conduct decisive combat operations to bring about peace. Third, there must be a general vision within the UN of the desired political outcome. And finally, force must be used only after all reasonable diplomatic efforts have failed. Without an established set of commitment criteria, NATO cannot develop and execute a peace-enforcement effort which will set the conditions for long range peace-building and regional stability in Europe.

The United States cannot help but be involved in Eastern Europe. It is doubtful that the UN and NATO, without the political support and the logistical resources of the United States, can be successful in making peace and building a secure Europe. The U.S. must continue its strong leadership role in the UN and provide incentives to make the UN more functional.⁸²

The United States can make the UN more functional by taking the initiative to restructure the UN Secretariat and develop a Deputy Secretary-General for Political, Security and Peace Affairs. In order for any UN mandated intervention by NATO to be effective, the

UN must develop a political organization to support and control sustained peace-enforcement operations and assist in diplomatic and post-conflict peace-building efforts. Only the United States has the strength to bring about this reorganization.

If the UN and NATO can successfully work together and bring peace to Europe, they could help set the conditions for other regional organizations becoming more involved in their areas and more closely tied to the UN. However, there currently is no other regional organization, outside of Europe, equal to NATO in enforcing and keeping peace in its region. No organization, other than NATO, has the political, economic or military strength necessary to conduct all phases of conflict resolution within a region.

In summary, the United Nations has a significant role to play in making and keeping peace in Europe. It can best accomplish that role by developing an organization under one Deputy Secretary-General which can effectively operate through all phases of conflict resolution and by convincing NATO to serve as its chief regional organization for operations in Europe.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are necessary for this study:

Coalition Action
Conflict
Crisis
Humanitarian Operations
Peacekeeping
Peacemaking
Peace-building
Peace-enforcement
Preventive Diplomacy
Preventive Deployment

Coalition Action- Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector or common interest.⁸³

Conflict- An armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited military or political objectives. While regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.⁸⁴

Crisis- An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.⁸⁵

Humanitarian Operations- Operations, conducted as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. The purposes are to provide relief and assistance to reduce suffering and death. The assistance is usually limited in scope and duration, and supplements the efforts of civilian authorities that have primary responsibility for providing disaster assistance.⁸⁶

Peacekeeping- Operations, conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions that support the diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict.⁸⁷

Peacemaking- Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.⁸⁸

Peace-building- Post-conflict diplomatic and military actions that seek to rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of a nation torn by civil war; or build bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.⁸⁹

Peace-enforcement- Military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities.⁹⁰

Preventive diplomacy- Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.⁹¹

Preventive deployment- When UN forces are sent to an area to deter cross border attacks or prevent hostilities within a country,

rather than wait until after armed conflict has occurred, and establish demilitarized zones in a preventive, rather than a post-conflict, context to separate potential belligerents.⁹²

APPENDIX B

ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ARCC- ACE Rapid Reaction CORPS

CIS- Commonwealth of Independent States

CSCE- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EC- European Community

EFU- European Political Union

MSC- Military Staff Committee

NACC- North Atlantic Cooperative Council

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAU- Organization of African Unity

OAS- Organization of American States

ORCI- Office for Research and the Collection of
Information

UN- United Nations

US- United States

WEU- Western European Union

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